- The U.S. military does not have the equipment or experience to successfully attack across a river.
- Those capabilities have atrophied and need an overhaul, an army commander argued.
- River crossings are dangerous and becoming more and more difficult.
The assault on a river is one of the most dangerous military operations. Yet if the U.S. military entered war tomorrow, it would not have the equipment, doctrine and experience to launch an attack across a defended river, according to an Army engineer.
“The Army has not conducted such an operation since World War II,” Army Engineer Maj. Aditya Iyer wrote in an essay for the Association of the American Army. For example, Army divisions do not have adequate bridging capabilities to conduct what the Army calls “wet breach” attacks, and would need support from corps-level units that might not be available.
“Current wet breaching doctrine, organization, materiel and leadership are ineffective for wet breaching operations at the division level, regardless of corps,” Iyer warned. River crossings are particularly dangerous as massed vehicles can be targeted as they cross or even become stuck on the opposite bank against a larger enemy.
To illustrate the neglect of riverine assaults, Iyer cites the fiasco of the Russian attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets River in May 2022, which the 74th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade attempted to storm using pontoon bridges mobile. The result was around 500 casualties and dozens of lost tanks.
Iyer lists multiple errors made by Russian commanders, including attacking only one point on the river, lack of prior reconnaissance, and attacking by day rather than night. “In contrast, Ukrainian forces had specific intelligence showing Russian troops massed along the river,” Iyer said. “Ukrainian engineering reconnaissance teams had also identified potential river crossings and had pre-coordinated artillery targets at the crossing sites, and they were right: Russian forces did use these sites. »
To be fair, the US military also has a checkered history when it comes to riverine assaults. At the Battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862, the Union Army made a foolish and bloody attempt to cross the Rappahannock River against entrenched Confederate defenders. In January 1944, the U.S. 36th Infantry Division launched a disastrous and ill-prepared nighttime assault on Italy’s Rapido River that resulted in nearly 2,000 casualties (furious survivors sparked a congressional investigation after the war).
Indeed, the army was not prepared for river crossings at the start of World War II. The divisions lacked sufficient bridging equipment – including bridges strong enough to support the weight of the tanks – making them dependent on corps-level resources. There was also no centralized authority to coordinate complex crossing operations. However, by the time of Operation Plunder – the massive assault on the Rhine in 1945, involving a million men and almost 6,000 artillery pieces – many of these problems had been resolved. The Rhine crossing even used US Navy landing craft normally used for amphibious assaults on the ocean.
On the contrary, crossing rivers is even more difficult these days. The ruses used by commanders like Napoleon – such as surprise raids on a weakly held point or feints to hide the real crossing point – are much more difficult when drones are constantly overhead, as in Ukraine. If the enemy manages to spot the passage, he can cover the beachhead with long-range missile and artillery strikes.
This has not been a problem in counter-insurgency operations in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan and Iraq. Major combat operations against Russia and China would be different, especially in regions like Eastern Europe, where there are plenty of rivers and canals. “The Russo-Ukrainian war highlighted that military technologies have evolved over the past decades and that the U.S. military must be prepared to conduct wetland crossing operations against a well-organized and technologically advanced force,” he said. said Iyer.
A 3rd Infantry Division multi-purpose armored vehicle leaves a barge of the 497th Multi-Role Deck Company, 92nd Engineer Battalion, September 21, 2023. Kevin Larson/US Army
The Army’s current wet space deficiencies resemble those of World War II. Brigade combat team engineer divisions and battalions do not have sufficient transition capabilities. The division is expected to use at least four multi-purpose bridge companies to cross a 400-meter (1,312-foot) river. But these special transition companies are controlled by corps headquarters.
“Divisions rely on corps augmentation for wet gap operations, including other means, such as military police and smoke,” Iyer noted. The Army also does not have enough multi-role bridge companies to support all of its divisions.
Additionally, many Army bridges, such as the Improved Ribbon Bridge, are not strong enough to support the weight of heavy vehicles such as the 70-ton M1 Abrams tank. “Today’s bridging equipment has the same capability gaps as those of World War II,” Iyer said.
The Army also needs a centralized doctrine for river-crossing operations that goes beyond just building the bridge itself, not how to seize and secure a bridgehead. “The publications remain technically focused on the considerations and calculations of engineers to execute a crossing,” Iyer said.
Simply having the engineering capability to quickly build a bridge across a mile-long river is no small feat. The question is whether this will be possible if the enemy objects.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine and other publications. He holds a master’s degree in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter And LinkedIn.
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