The war between Israel and Hamas is over, but there is still work to do – Israel News

The war is over. The disaster that started with the surprise attack of 6,000 armed men against 32 Israeli communities is over, because even if Gaza returns to spit fire, as will probably be the case, this will not relaunch the regional war that it has triggered in October 2023.

The 15 -month war which ended on Sunday included three levels: military, geopolitical and ideological.

The military war opposed Tsahal and the jihadist armies who attacked the Jewish state, one from the south, one from the north and two from afar. The geopolitical war opposed Israel to the jihadist axis and his two superpowers who support him. And the ideological war concerned the jihadist idea that animated the engineers of this war.

The ideological war is far from over, but this war is not directed only against Israel, and it is not for Israel to win. It is that of humanity. In the other two wars, the result is unambiguous: Israel has won.

The military outcome of the war was already mentioned from the first day. Yes, the motorcycles, zodiacs, vans and deltaplanes of Hamas successfully crossed the border, and their 6,000 riders committed many murders and looting, but it only took just 48 hours to kill, injure, capture and Hunt all the invasion strength. , until the last man.

The invaders’ plan, which consisted in reaching the West Bank and associating with its own activists, was thwarted, despite the terrible lack of preparation of Tsahal. The fighter Gazaoui, once in combat, turned out to be militarily underworld and logistically naked. To achieve the deeper invasion that Hamas had in mind, he had to provide his troops with food, gas and ammunition. If he had such capacities, he would never have deployed them.

To this tactical defect was added errors of fateful strategic judgment.

Hamas’ hypothesis, according to which Hezbollah invaded Galilee at the same time as he invaded the Negev, turned out to be false, but it was a minor calculation error. Hamas did not plan that Hezbollah would be struck down, in several ways: its management has been wiped out, its troops were decimated, its equipment was incinerated and its outposts were shaved.

Hamas has certainly failed to predict the political collapse of Hezbollah, since its Lebanese rivals installed a president to whom Hezbollah opposed, thus breaking the grip of Hezbollah on Lebanese politics.

Hamas calculation errors concerning Israel were even worse. The fundamental hypotheses of his invasion, according to which Tsahal would not dare to enter the urban density of Gaza and that the Israelis had lost the will to fight, proved to be unfounded.

Gaza was overwhelmed; Israeli soldiers fought beak and nail; Hamas troops were killed by the thousands; And the houses, roads, squares and sidewalks of Gaza have become lots of rubble, cement and dust.

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Yes, Hama’s offensive – as indicated here the week she was launched – will be among the most successful surprise attacks in military history. However, in the same way, the strategic dilettantism of its planners will be counted alongside that of Hitler when he stormed Stalingrad and that of Japan when he bombed Pearl Harbor. They had no idea what they caused.

We have talked a lot about the failures of the Israeli intelligence services which allowed the fiasco of October 7. However, the organizers of the massacre, who are no longer all among us, have known their own failures in terms of intelligence: ignorance of the capacities of TSAhal and the underestimation of his body spirit.

This is added to the broader failures of the war launched by Hamas, failures that he could not have predicts, but which are nevertheless the result of his attacks.

The attack on Hamas sparked Iran’s attacks on Israel, which led to Israeli counterattacks, revealing the military weakness of Iran. The attack on Hamas also caused the fall of Hezbollah, because it gave Israel a pretext to launch the attack without gloves that he had been preparing for years.

Finally, the Hezbollah attack caused the fall of the Syrian regime and the demolition of its army by TSAhal. Hezbollah provided the best warriors who faced Assad’s enemies in the Syrian civil war. The defeat of Hezbollah thus led the Syrian rebels to decide that the time of their assault on Damascus had arrived.

Yes, it was a chain reaction, and it now leaves Hamas alone, faced with defeat through the ruins of the Gaza tunnels and the mist of its burned earth.

This does not mean that Israel’s victory is total. This is not the case. The hostages have not yet returned home, Hamas has not yet been replaced and the pain of our losses – 1,844 killed and 23,907 injured while 143,000 Israelis have been moved – will haunt for decades.

Despite this, the war as it took place since October 23 ended, and it ended with an Israeli victory, because Hamas has lost its Iranian roof, its Lebanese backyard, its Syrian flank , as well as its geopolitical umbrella, after the loss by Russia of its strong Syrian. .

This is an incredible consequence, a cataclysm, in fact, and the question is who are the Israelis who made this possible?

The first winners of this war are the Israeli infantrymen, the regulars of university age who stormed Hamas and Hezbollah, and each of the 300,000 reservists who left their home, their family and their work to risk their lives On the multiple fronts of this war.

The second winners are the same security forces whose failures allowed the debacle of October 7: the intelligence agencies that have located and harpped the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah in Gaza, Beirut and Tehran; The land forces which invaded Gaza and southern Lebanon; And the Air Force that has launched unfailing attacks in multiple arenas between Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran.

Beyond them hid the military industries, whose drones did wonders in the alleys and tunnels of Gaza, and whose interceptors helped repel some 350 ballistic and cruise missiles drawn here from Iran.

Between all this, a man appears to be the embodiment of what we have experienced since the October 7 attack: the chief of staff, the lieutenant-general. Herzi Halévi

Halevi will remain memories like the soldier whose failures in terms of judgment, operational wisdom, mental resilience and humble leadership summed up everything that happened here during the war that started with the massacre of Hamas and ended with the defeat of his brains.

www.middleisrael.net

The writer, member of the Hartman Institute, is the author of the bestseller Mitzad Ha’ivelet Ha’yehudi (La Marche Jewish of madness, Yediot Sefarim, 2019), a revisionist history of the political direction of the Jewish people.