The United States Division on Swift could derail the Ukrainian peace talks

A disagreement between America and Europe on the reduction of Russia’s low impact sanctions could have great consequences for peace talks on Ukraine. The tariff wars will only complicate things. President Trump may have to weigh to break the dead end.

For the first time since the Ukraine crisis completed in 2014, a split appeared in the Western alliance policy on sanctions towards Russia. Peace talks have marketed the United States in Saudi Arabia at the end of last month, Russia and Ukraine compared to relaunch a 2022 Black Sea Grain Deal Through a sea cease. However, what promised to be a small step forward useful has become diverted by European and Ukrainian efforts to block minor concessions to Russia.

As part of the proposed Renaissance of a sea cease-fire, a European spokesman was quickly Stop suggestions that Russia could receive sanctions. At the Paris summit of the coalition of arrangements on March 26, European leaders and President Zelensky weighed further, calling for No sanctions repair For Russia, the repetition of the line according to which more sanctions are essential to bring Putin to the negotiating table.

The United States and Europe are no longer in the event of a policy on sanctions. Since 2015, the Ukrainian government has worked hard both to encourage Western powers to impose more sanctions on Russia and to minimize any possibility of abolition of sanctions in the context of peace efforts. Still in shock from seismic change in American politics to Ukraine under President Trump, Europe ranks on the side of Ukraine.

However, the argument on the repair of sanctions appears in a way a bogus debate which has the potential to disturb significant stages towards an essential peace.

More specifically, this argument on the sea cessor was triggered by the question of whether to authorize some limited access by a large Russian bank to the Swift payment messaging service service. This would allow importers to make the payment of Russian agricultural exports more easily. It is a tiny concession in the context of a Russian sanctions regime which includes more than 20,000 measures against individuals, businesses and types of goods.

Agricultural exports, although significant, are low in relation to the oil and gas exports of Russia which continue to constitute the bulk of Russia $ 433 billion in total Exports in 2024. The limited relaxation proposed of sanctions against rapid use would not extend to relief from Russian oil and gas trade.

But, in any case, the impact of the rapid ban is questionable. When the war broke out in 2022, it was described as “the nuclear option”. The separation of Russia’s ability to transform international trade would have had devastating short -term consequences on the volume of import revenues, so the argument has gone.

But that didn’t work.

In 2022 and after the start of the war, Russia generated a record of $ 592 billion in exports and exports since that time returned to the pre-war trend. There is little evidence that the partially exclusion of Swift Russia has had a substantial impact on the export volumes of Russia.

The idea that the rapid option was nuclear was only vaguely valid in 2014, the year when Western sanctions were imposed for the first time on Russia. That year, Russia exported more (497 billion dollars) than export in 2024, because the price of crude brent oscillated about $ 100 per barrel for the first half of the year, against about $ 72 today.

However, European nations have opposed a veto to the movements of the United States to cut Russia of Swift. They did it precisely because it would have had nuclear consequences for European energy security, at a time when Europe was more dependent, compared to now. It would also have been difficult in 2014 to withdraw Russia from Swift because Russia had a seat on the SWIFT board of directors, due to the volume of its international financial transactions.

During the eight years of indecision that followed, Russia worked hard to redirect its economy far from over-dependence on trade labeled in dollars. This helps to explain why its economy has remained resilient since the start of the war.

The rapid ban is in no way a sanction in itself, but rather an obstacle to the treatment of international payments, by reducing access to payment mail services. The hard currency does not pass through Swift. Swift sanction has stimulated a breed to create alternatives to an inherited system that is now over 50 years old cryptocurrency. RussiaChina and other countries have also developed their own alternatives.

While Russia has gradually moved its exports to Asia, these transactions are increasingly adjusted in local currencies, including yuan, rupees and rials.

The Saudi agreement to allow a Russian state bank to access SWIFT for agricultural exports will help to smooth the process. But that will not increase the volume of these exports, which continued throughout the war.

Of course, Russia will appreciate any softening of access to Swift due to the signal it sends from a progressive normalization of relations, in particular with the United States which would also strengthen the possibility of rescue more substantial sanctions when a longer term peace process takes place.

However, President Putin will also know that it is essentially an argument on a concession of minor sanctions with negligible economic advantages for his country. He will be aware of the potential of tension to build between President Trump and European leaders, because Zelensky urges Europe to resist any compromise advanced by the White House.

In the context of President Trump’s announcement on April 2 With regard to the taxation of prices against the European Union and other countries, Putin will come that relations are more embittered. Always getting out of small gains on the battlefield most of the time, Putin can afford to sit down and claim that Europeans and Ukrainians block progress and that he is the reasonable guy.

Thus, the rapid problem may become a useless lateral element. Treasury secretary Bessent kept The door opens for a partial Russian return, although the EU position seems to be more rooted. President Trump may have to get involved with European colleagues to eliminate blocking, if he wants to end the bloodshed in Ukraine.