The Russia chain of Russia now faster and more precise, and NATO must be ready

The Russia’s killing chain, or the speed with which the army goes from the search for a target to shoot, is now much more reactive and specifies than it was at the start of the war in Ukraine.

Federico Borsari, a resident colleague who researching war technology and innovation at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told Business Insider that “the Russians adapt, and that is certainly something that NATO notes”.

Russia exceeds the West in the production of artillery, raising the perspective that NATO must dissuade an opponent with more firepower on the battlefield and the fleets of recognition drones that guide him.

Beginning of Russian in war

One of the most serious problems for Russia at the start of the conflict was that the time between finding a target and shooting was far too slow. It took hours for indirect fires such as artillery and mortars, and even longer for cruise missiles.

Borsari wrote in a report published in early April that Russian strikes were sometimes delayed up to four hours, which makes them ineffective against the Ukrainian units which had long passed a new position.

“In the case of the tactical ballistic missile, that was the case,” he told Bi. “Sometimes it took even more time.”

Researchers from the Think Tank of the Royal United Services Institute, based in London, wrote in November 2022 that the Russian forces “lacked targets because of the self-imposed friction in their killing chains, generally hitting too late rather than not at all”.

A challenge is that the Russian recognition strike complex was ineffective, depending on Aging satellites and a handful of drones that could not keep the rhythm of the fighting.

Russia used surveillance drones such as Orlan-10 and Plépost at the start of its invasion, as evidenced by the Open-Source files of ORYX showing that many were destroyed in the spring of 2022. But there was too little information, surveillance and recognition (ISR) to be effective.

The selection of targets has suffered. Sometimes the Russian invaders would waste tactical missiles on small Ukrainian infantry groups while pepper vast aerodromes with a handful of cruise missiles.

Another problem was that the first command and control systems of Russia were too rigid, outdated and confused, bearing the descending characteristics of the structure of the Soviet command. After collecting information in a timely time, the troops on the ground had to wait for the strikes to be approved by various command levels.

And confusion only slowed down this. Many Russian soldiers and officers were also often clear in their areas of responsibility, problems that have been exacerbated by communication and technology problems.

For example, in the war at the start of the game, many Russian units did not have the laptops of stlettered that allowed them to effectively target Ukrainian forces, wrote Rusi Researchers in May 2023. The software consolidates the intelligence data of drones and recognition units, displaying them on a live card for commanders.

However, the Russian units which had computers, wrote the researchers, often left them sitting in luggage or who did not know how to install them.

How Russia repaired its killing chain

Now Russia uses a wide range of tactical drones to acquire targets in Ukraine, flooding the airspace of hundreds of observer systems at different altitudes and depths. Sometimes these ISR platforms can work together to feed the Russian commanders different visual angles of the same target.

While the Kremlin began to increase drone production, which was a rare resource in the early invasion quickly became the backbone of Russia’s recognition. In 2023, Tass de Moscow in Moscow reported that Russia had increased its supply of the Orlan drone by more than 50 times.

Insufficient Ukrainian aerial defenses have also given Russia more freedom of maneuverability with its greatest recondition drones, which allows it to collect information on Ukrainian operations at the rear and to make effective strikes that recall the Himar strikes that have proven to be extremely effective against the Russians.

Drons offering Russia a better view of the battle space, he has used short-range ballistic missiles more and more like the ISKANDER-M and his devastating glid bombs to more precisely reach the high-value targets in the Ukrainian rear.

A temporary shortage in artillery ammunition in 2023 also meant that Russia should learn to pass mass bombings – a bread and butter tactics – with precision strikes.

In addition, Russia’s command structure has evolved since the first days of war.

Rusi Land Warfare’s researchers, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, wrote in a 2023 report on the tactics of the Russian battlefield that “Russian artillery began to considerably refine the recognition strike complex” after seeing the Ukrainians devastating their ammunition stores and their command and control centers.

“This resulted in a much closer integration of several UAVs directly supporting commanders authorized to apply fires,” they said, noting that “Russian artillery has also improved its ability to draw from several positions and shoot and move”.

And Russia has started using the Strelet system better for greater consistency in combat.

Other technologies have also played a role. Like Ukraine, Russian troops have integrated civilian technology into their operations, such as smartphones and satellite communication terminals. This approach made the Russian units at the lower level more coherent and capable of merging intelligence and hitting command on a single image.

In October, for example, Russian troops were widely seen using the Discord video messaging application to relay real -time information on the battlefield and coordinate strikes.

Although these systems are easier to use, there are notable drawbacks. For example, the use of smartphones on the battlefield has led to strikes on the user’s position, Intel leaks and other problems. Military leaders, from Russia to the United States, cautious against this behavior.

NATO needs to be careful

The faster and improved killing chain of Russia means that Western forces preparing for the possibility of a high power conflict should focus even more on the formation of troops to fight while moving quickly and in small training to reduce exposure to strikes, said Borsari.

“Since the start of the large-scale invasion, the emphasis has been incredibly greater on the need for more dispersed and disaggregated forces on the part of NATO,” he said.

The disintegration has been increasingly recognized as a necessity on the modern battlefield. It is a driving factor behind Western training activities such as road operations for combat aircraft, but there is more work to do.

Sam Cranny-Evans, director of the British Council Caliber Defense, wrote in January for the Center for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research that NATO should expect a more experienced Russia ready to fight with precision.

“This is important for the British army and its allies,” he wrote, “because the evidence available indicate that Russia has moved away from the Soviet roots which informed its doctrine of counter-battery, towards a precise, fatal and large-scale doctrine.”

Borsari said that an immediate action than the United States and Europe can take is to aim for the manufacture of Russia for high-tech drones and precision ammunition, which are often based on overseas parts.

“Western sanctions have, in a way, slowed down the purchase of components for this production. This would affect Russia’s ability to deploy on a large scale and sustainably,” he said.