The Palestinians have experienced a Nakba, but feel victorious

The war of iron swords joins a series of conflicts in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict which ends in the fairly complex situation of Israel collecting military successes and the strategic achievements associated with a feeling of failure and bitterness . The Arab side, on the other hand, has taken serious blows and came out of the loser in military terms, but considers war as a historical achievement – mainly since Israel was damaged and caught by surprise at its beginning, and at its end Israel has not won a decisive victory.

This was the case in the Sinai campaign in 1956 when, as in the current war, Israel was forced by the United States to withdraw from the conquered territories and put an end to the conflict. The same goes for the Yom Kippur War, the second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War and the protection edge of the 2014 operation.

The Arab collective memory considers these events as achievements resulting from sacrifice and the ability to absorb serious blows, to present firmness (“SUMUD”) and to make Israel impossible to declare a decisive victory. This phenomenon should not lead Israel to conclude that it has been defeated but must be understood so as to formulate sober goals and action plans in the treatment of enemies in the region.

There is a feeling of accomplishment in the Palestinian arena concerning the signing of the current agreement of Israel-Hamas, was focused on Hamas’ efforts to establish a story by which: “On October 7, Netanyahu declared His goal of destroying Hamas, but after 15 months an agreement with him. In other words, de facto recognizing Hamas as the dominant force in Gaza, for which no alternative exists. A similar feeling is also widespread among many gas which, despite unprecedented sufferings caused by the ideological adventures afflicted by Sinwar, nevertheless consider that the agreement, as on October 7, as a national success.

There is practically no soul on the Palestinian side for the current war – or not at all. Here and there, you could hear a critical voice of Hamas, mainly officials of the Palestinian authority, but, as during the second intifada, focusing on the damage caused or poorly judged policy, but not concerning the massacre caused against Israelis. This lack of soul research is particularly striking with regard to October 7: most Palestinians believe that it was an attack on military targets, not accompanied by war crimes. No eminent Palestinian intellectual, political leader or political analyst speaks of regret, shame or responsibility of the massacre.

For the moment, there is no sign of soul research concerning the price of war. The responsibility of the carnage and destruction, described as a nakba superior to that of 1948, is posed at the Porte d’Israel. This reflects a long -standing fundamental Palestinian defect: a “bipolarity” with, on the one hand, a spirit of combat and praise for the ability to harm Israel and, on the other hand, to the victim of war results that the Palestinians themselves started.

For decades, this model was repeated by a defeated aggressor demanding compassion while, at the same time, refusing to be mercy. Many Palestinians cling to the dichotomy of being “natives” who are still right, and are therefore allowed to resort to violence against a “colonial power” which is always satanic, opting for fantasy, the slogans and the “Historical justice” on achievable solutions; Insist to back down the wheels of history and, above all, to escape self -criticism or the ability to demonstrate empathy towards the Israelis, including civilians, invariably collectively defined as “colonists”, thus constituting legitimate targets.

Understanding how the Palestinians perceive the end of the war is essential to formulate plans sensible for the future. On October 7, the “conception” – supported by the left and the right – that the radical elements, in particular those who have become sovereign, could be “tamed”, was not the only thing to collapse. The idea that the occupation is at the origin of the conflict and that the solution is a Palestinian state, has also collapsed.

The brutality and demonization exhibited on October 7 come from political repression or economic deprivation, but rather from a religious and cultural animosity that burns for years. The Palestinians refuse, or do not want to admit it. It is important, however, that at least the Israelis should recognize the dark truth. We have to free ourselves from the ideas defended by high -ranking Israeli officials to try to “deradicate the Palestinians, as in Germany and Japan” – a possible process by the search for soul, rather than by external coercion.

Another overview which must be learned from October 7 – by the Palestinians, but more important by the Israelis – is that Hamas is not a traffic accident in Palestinian history, passed by the lack of political negotiation or general distress. The men of Hamas are not “extraterrestrials”, far from the society in which they operate (like the Islamic State), but rather part of it, merged. They influence it, by representing large parts and reflect deep trends inside. Such a body cannot be “erased”, as many have declared it since October 7. Conversely, it must also be understood that there is no clear dichotomous division between Hamas and the general public – an image that Hamas itself tries to manipulate the market.

The feeling of Palestinian realization encourages the position of Hamas among the Palestinians and the perception that exalts the undergoing struggle against Israel. The Worst War in the History of the Israel -Arab Conflict, in Which Tens of Thousands of Gazans Have Been Killed and the Gaza Strip Has Been Destroyed, Ended With Unpreceded Hostility and A Burning Desire for Revenge Toward Israelis – Presumably One of Siwar’s Goals War. It is not surprising that almost no voice sounded, either during or according to the war, concerning the need to abandon the path of the confrontation, and even less to wake up, to recognize and to promote coexistence with Israel.

The obvious gap in the perception of the two war societies still improves the question of whether the dialogue can now be advanced, especially as a side abstains from self-criticism, and the other has tendency to self-spawning. In such a situation, the discourse around a Palestinian state seems to be a solution as a little divorced with reality. That said, the idea of ​​a single river country at sea is a dangerous fantasy that will only lead to a bloody Balkan situation between two people separated by a deep fracture in terms of culture and values.

The two -state vision must be substituted by a sober separation in ways. The proposal to create a physical buffer zone between the two peoples, which can be advanced without questioning because, for the moment, at least, there is no address on the Palestinian side ready to make historical concessions, the markets less for the public. This will imply defining the physical borders in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and ensuring that the doors of the Palestinian entity, the Jordan River valley and the Philadelphi corridor, are never controlled by the Palestinians. There will be clearly a close economic and infrastructure link between this entity and Israel and, to contain the volatile demographic and geographic scenario between the two peoples, the FDI will obviously have to intervene constantly to eliminate security threats.

This solution is far from ideal. However, compared to a single state or the situation which continues as is – it is the slightest evil.

Dr. Michael Milshtein is the head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University