The Kremlin’s growing influence in Orbán’s Hungary – POLITICO

For example, while other European countries have reduced the staffing of their Russian embassies and consulates, the staffing of the Russian embassy in Budapest is increasing.

The International Investment Bank – a multilateral financial institution controlled by the Russian government and headquartered in Budapest since 2019 – enjoyed full diplomatic immunity until 2023, which neighboring Slovakia refused when Russia raised the possibility of moving its headquarters to Bratislava. And under the agreement with the Hungarian government, this immunity extends not only to top officials of the bank, but also to all employees and consultants, as well as all guests that the bank invites from Russia or third countries, which then enjoy freedom of movement within the Schengen area.

Russian hackers also regularly accessed Hungarian Foreign Ministry servers without any official diplomatic response from Budapest. And, more openly, Hungarian state media relentlessly spread misinformation about the Kremlin to justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine. According to pro-government media, it is the US, EU and NATO that are warmongers, and Ukraine has no borders because “it has not registered them” with the UN.

Additionally, at Orbán’s request, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow – head of the Russian Orthodox Church – was not included in a sanctions list proposed by the EU. Kirill is a key Putin propagandist and his church has enjoyed strong financial support from the Hungarian government, despite the fact that only 14,000 Hungarian citizens identify as Orthodox.

Although frustrated by all this, Brussels and Washington appear baffled about how to end Hungary’s alignment with autocracies. Instead, they abandoned their plans or made short-term deals. But the current scale of Russian influence in Hungary – and Orbán’s willingness to allow and profit from it – requires immediate action.

There is also a strong case for invoking the Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which sanctions high-ranking Hungarian government officials and oligarchs involved in foreign direct investment projects of Russian origin. Mészáros deserves special attention here, given his involvement in several Moscow-allied projects, including a £10.6 million loan from his bank to the 2022 presidential campaign of French opposition leader Marine Le Pen at Orbán’s request.

Overall, the deepening of ties between Russia and Hungary can no longer go unchecked.