But even as Boeing emerged from Max’s crisis, it faced another: the coronavirus pandemic crippled aviation, crippling airlines around the world and forcing many to rethink, or at least delay, plans to purchase new aircraft. Boeing has also slowed production and halted deliveries of its 787 Dreamliner amid quality issues.
The FAA and Boeing declined to comment.
MCAS, the flight control software involved in crashes, was designed to counter the Max’s tendency to rear up in certain situations. It would only work at certain fast speeds, Boeing and Mr. Forkner told the FAA in June 2015, according to the indictment.
At the time, Mr. Forkner was Boeing’s chief technical pilot, a senior position responsible for the company’s interaction with the FAA group that determined what kind of training pilots would need before flying the Max.
During a simulated test flight in November 2016, Forkner found that the software could be triggered at slower speeds, including those commonly encountered during take-off and landing. Shortly after, he shared his discovery with a colleague, saying in an instant message “I basically lied to regulators (without knowing it),” according to the filing.
Mr Forkner did not share the finding with the agency and repeatedly recommended that it be removed from an upcoming FAA report on the Max because it was “well outside the normal operational envelope” , according to the indictment. Based on this information, the agency removed the mention of software in the report and MCAS was subsequently excluded from manuals and training materials.
The software was found to work moments before the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Before allowing the Max to fly again, the FAA instructed Boeing to update the MCAS to prevent erroneous activation and to update the display software to alert pilots to any conflicting data relating to the angle of the aircraft and the sensors, among other changes.