THE 12 -day confrontation between Iran and Israel In June 2025, may not turn into a large -scale regional war, but it marked a potential Turning in the internal political landscape of Iran.
Although the Islamic Republic has already concluded a direct conflict with a foreign opponent, he has never done it while militarily,, inner fractured And increasingly alienated of its own population.
And unlike the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980sWhen national unity has merged around the defense of Iranian sovereignty, this time, the government seemed to fight without significant public support. Although precise surveys of Iran’s interior are difficult to find, the lack of pro-government rallies, the Low approval numbers for the government Before the war and the Government subsequent repression Since telling their own stories.
Inasmuch as researcher from different ethnic groups in the countryI know that many Iranians – in particular those of historically marginalized communities – Given the conflict With Israel not as a defense of the nation but as an imprudent consequence of the ideological adventurism of the government and regional proxy campaigns. He placed the Islamic Republic in its most vulnerable position since its creation after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Hard power and sweet has decreased
It is worth taking an instantaneous of the decrease in the decrease in the Iranian government which follows the recent series of blows.
It is gentle power – Once built on revolutionary legitimacy, Shiite ideological influence and anti -Western propaganda – has been considerably eroded.
For decades, the Islamic Republic was based on a powerful story: that it was the only government daring for face the United States and IsraelDefend Muslim causes on a global scale and serve as a spiritual leader of the Islamic world. This image, projected by the state media, proxy militias and religious rhetoric, helped the government justify its foreign interventions and massive military spending, in particular for nuclear development and regional militias.
But this story no longer resonates as it did once. Iran leaders can no longer claim to inspire unity at home or fear abroad. Even among the Shiite populations in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, support during the Israel-Iran confrontation was in a mute. In the interior of Iran, on the other hand, propaganda describing Israel as the existential enemy has lost its grip, Especially among young peoplewhich are increasingly identified with human rights movements rather than government slogans.
It is also clear that Iran Hard power is weakening. The loss of senior commanders and the destruction of important military infrastructure has shown that government intelligence and security systems are seriously compromised.
AFP via Getty Images
Even before the attack on Israel, a certain number of reports showed that the Iranian army was in its Weakest state for decades. The real surprise of the recent war did not come from the scale of damage to the Israeli and American bombs, but from the depth of Israel, Israel has penetrated the upper levels of the Iranian military and intelligence sectors. The recent conflict was equivalent to security as well as military failure.
Externally defeated, in an internal drift
As its power in the region appears, the same goes for the grip of the Iranian government which is relaxing internally. An investigation in 2024 of the Iranian Ministry of Culture revealed “dissatisfaction” among the populationwith More than 90% of Iranians “dissatisfiedWith the current position of the country. The elections in November 2024 saw a participation of less than 40%More emphasizing the dissatisfaction of Iranians with regard to the political process.
And the interior relationships of Iran suggest that many Iranians blame government policies for war with Israel. “I blame the decision -makers of this country”, ” A Rasht resident told Reuters“Their policies have brought us war and destruction.”
The government responded with a tactic that it previously used: repression. According to the media aligned by the government, More than 700 people have been arrested During and immediately the conflict, accused of collaboration with Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.
As in past repressions, the regions of the ethnic minority – in particular the Kurdish areas – were targeted.
One day after the ceasefire with Israel, the government executed three Kurdish cross -border workers which are counting on smuggling products to survive in the Kurdish provinces underdeveloped in Iran.
These executions, which have been carried out without lawsuit or legal advisor, adapt to the way the government uses ethnic scapegoats to stay in power. And that echoes a historic scheme: when the government feels threatened, it first strikes the Kurds.
A model of historical repression
The Kurds are estimated at 10 to 12 million in Iran, by composing About 12% to 15% of the country’s total population – Make it the third ethnic group after the Persians and the Azeris. Iran also includes important Baluch and Arab minorities.
When the Islamic Republic was created in 1979, many ethnic groups supported the revolution. They hoped for a more inclusive and democratic Iran than what preceded it – the brutal autocracy of the Shah who had frequently targeted minorities.
These hopes were quickly destroyed. By rejecting pluralism and promoting a unifying ideology centered on Shiite Islam and Persian identity, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Marginalized non-personal and non-Shiite groups.
Other ethnic groups have been seen with suspicion, while Shiite Azerbaijani were mainly co -opted in the system.
Khomeini declared jihad against Kurdish resistance groups, qualifying them as infidels, separatists and agents of Israel and the United States.
Armed with advanced weapons inherited from the last Shah Pahlavi, the government launched a military campaign in the province of Kurdistan. Many Kurdish villages and cities have been destroyed and About 50,000 Iranian Kurds were killed Between 1979 and 1988.
The region has been transformed into a militarized area – a status that continues today.
Kurdish campaign
After the end of the Iran -Iraq war in August 1988, the government – economically tense and weakened militarily – Feared a domestic uprising.
But instead of adopting a political reform, he responded with one of the most brutal repression in the history of Iran. Khomeini published a fatwa, or religious edict, Order execution Political prisoners, including a large number of Kurdish dissidents.
Between the end of July and September 1988, thousands of political prisoners were executed – a lot without trial or any legal processes. At least 5,000 people were killed and buried in unmarked mass pits, According to Amnesty International.
Khomeiny called them as “Mohareb” or “warriors against God” and criticized the revolutionary courts for not having condemned them to death earlier. This mass execution campaign reported the government’s determination to eliminate any dissent, regardless of legal standards or human rights standards.
In the years that followed the government systematically assassinates the eminent Kurdish chiefs and other opposition leadersboth in Iran and abroad.
Bettmann Archive / Getty Images
This targeted elimination of the Kurdish management, combined with mass executions of political prisoners, was a deliberate strategy to decapitate any organized opposition before being able to question the survival of the government.
A new crisis, the same strategy
The Islamic Republic seems to use the same manual now, but under much more fragile conditions.
Given the precarious government of the government, it is fair to wonder why there are no more protests now, especially in the regions of ethnic minorities. For many, the answer is the fear of what is happening next.
Many Kurds have learned previous uprisings – in particular 2022 “Movement of women, life, freedom ” – that when they lead demonstrations, they face the hardest repression. On 56% of people killed and persecuted In subsequent repression were the Kurds.
Meanwhile, the global opposition remains fractured and without leader, both according to ethnic lines and in terms of objectives. The main opposition groups have traditionally hesitated to recognize ethnic rights, and even less include them in any vision of an Iran. They insist rather on “territorial integrity” as a prerequisite for any dialogueechoing the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic.
It is a key heritage of the Islamic Republic: its propaganda not only shaped domestic opinion, but also influenced the opposition, dividing the Iranians to the country and abroad. And he has long mobilized the dominant ethnic group against minorities, in particular the Kurds, representing them as internal enemies.
