President Ronald Reagan is often credited with defeating the Soviet Union, in part by aiding Afghan rebels, but it was President Jimmy Carter’s administration that laid the groundwork.
Considered by many to be a foreign policy novice when he entered the White House, Carter made an early decision to provide covert aid to Afghan insurgents months before the Soviet invasion. The move opens a window into one of the defining issues of his presidency, showing a president unafraid to confront the Soviets while pursuing a policy of détente.
“I think people’s image of Carter as a deeply religious, deeply moral man is very much influenced by the activities he did after leaving office. (But) he definitely had a ruthless side, and he had a side that was very willing to use force, including nuclear weapons,” said David Gibbs, a history professor at the University of Arizona.
The covert aid program launched under Carter became the backbone of the Afghan insurgency, paving the way for the Soviet Union’s eventual withdrawal in 1989.
In a bold move, six months before the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Carter signed a secret directive known as the “presidential conclusion” authorizing the CIA to provide non-lethal aid to rebels fighting the Afghan communist government-backed government. Soviets.
This discovery remained secret for nearly two decades, only coming to light when several Carter administration officials, including former CIA Director Robert Gates and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, revealed its existence in the 1990s, suggesting that the Carter administration aimed to attract the Soviets. a Vietnamese-style quagmire.
“Afghan Trap”
Brzezinski’s revelations were the most striking. In a 1998 interview with a French magazine, the Polish-born and ardently anti-communist Carter adviser denied provoking the Soviets but claimed the administration had “knowingly increased the likelihood” of a Soviet invasion. . Calling the program a “great idea,” he said it had “the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.”
Although Brzezinski later disputed the accuracy of the interview and never reiterated the claim, the so-called “Afghan trap” thesis has gained ground, with critics accusing the Carter administration of instigating the The Soviet invasion led to decades of conflict in Afghanistan.
Among experts who view the aid package as a deliberate provocation, Gibbs said he was initially reluctant to read too much into the Brzezinski interview before becoming convinced of its veracity.
As Gibbs described it to VOA, a military aide once told historian Jonathan Haslam that Brzezinski, upon learning of the Soviet invasion, “threw his first punch into the air in triumph and said: “They took the bait!” »
“It implied that the decision to provide aid to the mujahideen was bait,” Gibbs said. “That, to me, is a strong indication that what he said is true, because it was said twice over a period of time, and it came from the horse’s mouth.”
The Afghan trap thesis has permeated the work of other prominent experts, although most now dismiss it as baseless, according to historian Conor Tobin of University College Dublin, who has researched the issue.
The problem with this theory, according to Tobin, is that it views the Carter administration’s involvement in Afghanistan through the lens of the 21st century, “working backwards from the events of 9/11.”
“They rely almost exclusively on Gates’ memoir, the controversial interview in France, and other circumstantial and limited anecdotal evidence without exploring the subject in detail and without using other sources to corroborate the statements made,” said Tobin via email to VOA.
A close look at recently declassified documents from the Carter era reveals a different story, Tobin said.
“This reveals that there was no attempt to trap the Soviet Union in the Afghan trap and that American policy was in fact marginal in the Soviet military intervention,” he said.
Non-lethal aid
What is not up for debate, however, is that the aid program was launched in response to growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan. In April 1978, a communist coup d’état overthrew the government of President Mohammad Daoud. The new regime then launched radical reforms, sparking public opposition and ultimately a full-blown insurrection.
According to Tobin, the Carter administration initially took a “wait and see” approach. This policy ended with the kidnapping and murder of American Ambassador Adolph Dubs the following February. Brzezinski then ordered a new plan for Afghanistan.
“Should we help insurgents? he asked an aide to investigate, according to Tobin. “Who should we work with?
However, a popular revolt in the western Afghan city of Herat “led to a change in attitude in Washington and the consensus began to slide toward a more active role,” Tobin writes in his analysis : “The myth of the “Afghan trap”.”
CIA agents sprang into action, developing a plan of action while contacting U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Several options have been formulated, ranging from small-scale propaganda campaigns and non-lethal support to the provision of lethal weapons and military training via a third country.
After determining that military assistance could “provoke vigorous Soviet countermeasures,” the administration opted for nonlethal assistance.
“The decision-making process demonstrated caution rather than an effort to provoke an invasion,” Tobin wrote.
On July 3, 1979, Carter authorized the CIA to provide up to $695,000 in aid to the insurgents. By mid-August, $575,000 of those funds had been allocated in cash, medical equipment and radio transmitters to Pakistani intelligence services, which then handed them over to the mujahideen, according to Tobin’s account.
The aid package, Tobin says, was small but important in two key respects. This established links with the mujahideen through Pakistani intelligence that would prove invaluable after the Soviet invasion. It also underlined American resolve towards its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, reassuring them at a time when concerns about diminishing American influence in the region were growing.
The aid program took place against a backdrop of escalating Cold War tensions. The Iranian Revolution of February 1979 deprived the United States of a key strategic ally in the region. Rather than seeking to provoke the Soviets, Brzezinski worried about “creeping intervention” in Afghanistan, fearing that “Moscow would continue to expand its influence until a de facto invasion took place,” Tobin wrote .
“The goals in mid-1979 were basically to do something, anything, to counter the Soviet advance in Afghanistan,” Tobin said.
Historian Scott Kaufman of Francis Marion University and author of a book on Carter’s foreign policy, said the late president also had to think about running for re-election the following year.
“He was already under attack for ‘losing’ Nicaragua to the communists and for being ‘soft’ on the Soviet Union,” Kaufman told VOA via email. “What would voters look like if Carter, who wanted to pass the SALT II negotiations (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), took steps that encouraged what would be seen by them as further Soviet aggression? »
“Carter Doctrine”
Kaufman challenged the popular perception that Carter was a foreign policy novice. Although he did not have the foreign policy experience of a Richard Nixon or even a Gerald Ford, Carter served on the Trilateral Commission and traveled abroad as governor of Georgia, noted Kaufman.
“That said, his support for the mujahideen reflected a foreign policy that, since at least 1978, reflected a hardening of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union,” he said.
Carter’s tougher stance, Kaufman said, was motivated by growing anti-Soviet sentiment in Congress, Brzezinski’s influence, and his personal contempt for Soviet repression and machinations.
“This does not mean that he has given up on seeking détente with the Soviets, as evidenced by his desire to have SALT II ratified,” he said. “But its foreign policy towards the USSR (Soviet Union) showed that it was prepared to take a harder line.”
Nothing demonstrated Carter’s resolve more forcefully than the “Carter Doctrine,” his bold Persian Gulf policy adopted in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Unveiling the new policy during his State of the Union address in 1980, Carter warned that the United States was prepared to use “any means necessary” to prevent a Soviet takeover of the Persian Gulf region. .
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration raised the bar. On December 28, 1979, the day after the assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin by Soviet commandos in Kabul, Carter signed a new document authorizing the supply of weapons and training to the mujahideen. The first batch of weapons arrived in Pakistan in less than two weeks.
Carter then lost the 1980 election to Reagan, whose administration largely continued Carter’s Afghanistan policy for several years before dramatically expanding the secret aid program to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year. . Instead of just harassing the Soviets, the Reagan administration sought to defeat them, according to Tobin.
“Criticism of the Carter administration as weak on defense is therefore unwarranted, with Carter largely setting the stage for the new global containment of the 1980s,” Tobin said.
“Thus, despite continuing orthodox assessments of Carter as a foreign policy failure, he left office in January 1981, leaving a clear foreign policy direction for the new Reagan administration that arguably contributed to the end of the Cold War a decade later – an outcome that was almost incomprehensible as the Carter administration took office in January 1977.”
USA voanews
