Washington-Today, the Ministry of the Treasury for Control of Foreign Assets (OFAC) has taken measures against a network of Houthi financial facilitators and supply agents working in coordination with Sa’id al-Jamal, a Houthi financial official supported by Iran Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force Force (IRGC-QF). This network has provided tens of millions of dollars in basic products from Russia, including weapons and sensitive goods, as well as stolen Ukrainian grains, to ship to Yemen controlled by Houthi. In addition, the OFAC has identified eight digital asset portfolios used by Houthis to transfer funds associated with their activities.
“The Houthis remain dependent on Sa’id al-Jamal and its network to obtain critical goods to provide the group’s terrorist war machine,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. “Today’s action highlights our commitment to degrading the capacity of Houthis to threaten the region thanks to their destabilizing activities.”
The Houthis have deployed missiles, unmanned air vehicles (UAV) and naval mines to attack the interests of commercial expeditions in the Red Sea, threatening global freedom of navigation and integrity of international trade. These blind attacks on civilian economic infrastructure, activated and encouraged by the support of the Iranian regime, resulted in the death of innocent civilians and led to millions of dollars of damage to commercial shipment.
Today’s measures are taken under the counter-terrorism authority, Executive Order (EO) 13224, as modified. The appointment of Ansarallah by the American Department of State (commonly called the Houthis) as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) in accordance with the EO 13224, as amended, entered into force on February 16, 2024. OFAC appointed Sa’id al-Jamal continuing to EO 13224, June 10, June 10, to or in support of the IRGC-QF. The OFAC appointed IRGC-QF in accordance with the OE 13224 on October 25, 2007 to provide material support to several terrorist groups.
Houthi supply network
Afghan Business Man based in Russia Hushang Ghairat (Hushang) and his brother, an Afghan businessman based in Russia Sohrab Ghairat (Sohrab) helped Sa’id al-Jamal with Houthi commercial initiatives in Russia, including arms supply. In summer and autumn 2024, Hushang and Sohrab, in the direction of Sa’id Al-Jamal, orchestrated at least two expeditions of Ukrainian cereals stolen from Crimea to Yemen aboard Russia Flagged in Russia Am ths (IMO: 9720263), also known as Zafar.
In Hong Kong Am Asia M6 Ltd is the registered owner, the ship manager and the AM Operator Thésée. Russian national Vladimirovich vidanov vladimirov (Vidanov) was the captain of Am Thésau Yuri Vladimirovich Belyakov (Belyakov) was captain of the ship until the end of 2024.
Hushang, Sohrab, Am Asia M6 LTD, Vidanov and Belyakov are designated in accordance with the OE 13224, as modified, to have material aid, sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sa’id al-Jamal. The amus is identified as a blocked property in which AMA Asia M6 Ltd has an interest.
Sohrab is the director general of three companies based in Russia: LLC sky setting,, LLC EdisonAnd Kolibri LLC group. LLC Sky Frame, LLC Edison and LLC Kolibri Group are designated in accordance with the EO 13224, as modified, to be held, controlled or directed by, directly or indirectly, Sohrab.
Houthi money laundering and shipping activities
Hushang, Sohrab and Sa’id Al-Jamal use financial facilitators to support financial companies in the Houthi business involving Russia, including the above-mentioned cereal shipments. Laureur of Iranian silver based in Turkiye Hassan Jafari (Jafari) worked with Hushang and Sa’id Al-Jamal to whiten dollars on behalf of the Sa’id Al-Jamal network, allowing the escape of the network sanctions. Jafari also organized payments worth millions of dollars in support of shipments benefiting the Houthis.
Jafari is appointed in accordance with the EO 13224, as modified, for having helped, sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support for or to support Hushang or in support of Hushang.
Sanctions the implications
Following today’s action, all property and interests in the ownership of the designated persons described above which are in the United States or in possession or control of American people are / are blocked and must be reported to the OFAC. In addition, all the entities held, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50% or more by one or more blocked people are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, American sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by American or inside (or transit) the United States which involves any good or interest in the ownership of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of American sanctions can lead to the taxation of civil or criminal sanctions on American and foreign people. OFAC can impose civil sanctions for infringements of sanctions on a strict responsibility. OFAC Economic Sanctions Application Directives provide more information on the application of OFAC for American economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other people may risk exposure to sanctions to engage in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked people.
In addition, engaging in certain transactions with people designated today includes a risk of secondary sanctions in accordance with the OE 13224, as modified. In accordance with this authority, the OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions for opening or maintenance, in the United States, a corresponding account or a payable account of a foreign financial institution which knowingly or facilitates any important transaction in the name of a specially designated global terrorist.
Exports, re -exports or transfers of articles subject to American export controls involving people included on the list of ITBs in accordance with the OE 13224, as modified, may be subject to additional restrictions administered by the Ministry of Commerce, the Industry and Security Office. See 15 CFR section 744.8 for more information.
The power and integrity of the SOFAC sanctions derive not only from the OFAC capacity to designate and add people to specially designated nationals and blocked persons (SDN), but also from its desire to withdraw people from the list of NTCs in accordance with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to cause a positive change in behavior. For more information regarding the process of deleting an OFAC list, including the SDN list, please refer to the frequently posed question of the OFAC here and to submit a request for referral, click here.
Consult identification information on individuals and entities designated today.
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