Matches played in the group stage are different from the round of 16 in any international competition.
Theoretically, opponents become tougher as you progress to the later stages of a tournament and they also have a better idea of how you’ve played up to that point.
After three games, it is possible to analyse how a team plays with and without the ball with a recent sample, rather than a sample taken from the international friendlies of March and June.
If we take the example of Germany, their opponents now know that in possession of the ball, Toni Kroos will pass to the left side of the defense to form a 3-1 with Robert Andrich in front of him.
From this remote position, Kroos directed the German attacks as they attempted to find the three narrow number 10s between the lines. “Playing with Toni, I have the freedom to stay more in front and wait because I know the ball is going to come at some point,” Ilkay Gundogan said recently Athleticism.
“He reads the game, gives us balance with and without the ball, and he gives other players like me more freedom to get into dangerous positions.”
Therefore, any team that wants to limit the German threat on the ball and not fall victim to the complex combinations of Gundogan, Jamal Musiala, Kai Havertz and Florian Wirtz must stop the supply at its source.
The round of 16 brought up a new contender, with Denmark looking to get there by pressing Germany’s 3-1 build-up first and sorting out the rest of the issues later.
Aside from their 5-4-1 setup, Denmark focused on pressing Antonio Rudiger, Nico Schlotterbeck and Kroos using Christian Eriksen, Rasmus Hojlund and Andreas Skov Olsen, with Thomas Delaney and Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg in zone roles behind them.
Eriksen had a complex role as he had to drop and support Denmark’s left-back and center-back, but Skov Olsen’s main task without the ball was to stifle Kroos and not give him time to play with it. the ball.
The logical question was how Denmark could use five players to press four German players without getting into trouble, as that numerical advantage offered Julian Nagelsmann’s team a six-on-five scenario behind Delaney and Hojbjerg.
The first part of the answer was that the Danish midfield duo dropped back to help their centre-backs track Leroy Sane, Gundogan and Musiala.
Here, Skov Olsen presses Kroos and Delaney collects the deflected pass, but even though it goes around the attacker, Hojbjerg heads towards Musiala.
The other was that the Danish back five changed markers effectively to defend against the three German No.10s.
In this example, Schlotterbeck finds an angle to pass towards Gundogan, but Jannik Vestergaard immediately jumps towards the German captain and Joachim Andersen moves inside to collect Havertz.
Gundogan then tries to return the ball to the Arsenal striker, but Andersen intercepts it and launches the counterattack, finding Skov Olsen.
Germany’s impressive start to the match was tempered by Denmark’s organisation without the ball, which also created transitional situations for Kasper Hjulmand’s team. Skov Olsen’s pressure forced Kroos to make safer passes instead of crossing the line and, on a few occasions, to make mistakes.
Denmark’s best chance in the first half came from recovering the ball and counterattacking. Here, Eriksen is lower to support the left side of the Danish defense, Hojbjerg collects Gundogan, Skov Olsen presses Schlotterbeck and Hojlund is in position to limit Kroos’ time on the ball. This forces the German midfielder to make the quickest pass possible to Musiala and Andersen jumps to press him.
Musiala tries to find Andrich, but Delaney intercepts the pass to start the counterattack and it ends with Manuel Neuer saving a one-on-one situation against Hojlund.
Denmark’s off-the-ball approach limited Germany’s attacking threat in open play, but Nagelsmann’s side showed they had several solutions with the ball.
Due to Eriksen’s complex role out of possession, Rudiger had more time on the ball than Schlotterbeck and Kroos and the Real Madrid defender attempted to find Havertz’s run behind the defense on several occasions.
Similar to the 2-0 win over Hungary, Havertz attacked the space behind the centre-back as the latter stepped forward to become one of Germany’s No.10s.
In this example, Eriksen is deeper than Skov Olsen, allowing Rudiger more time on the ball compared to Kroos.
While the central defender looks for runners, Havertz attacks the space behind Andreas Christensen, who must watch Sane. Rudiger’s pass finds Havertz, but Vestergaard is in the right position to defend this attack.
In another example, Andersen moves up to follow Musiala’s positioning between the lines and Havertz moves smartly towards the vacant space in the Danish defense.
When Andrich passes the ball to Rudiger, Havertz is in position to attack the space behind Andersen…
…and he runs into this area while being on Vestergaard’s blind side. Rudiger finds him…
…but Havertz’s shot is stopped by Kasper Schmeichel.
Although Rudiger’s long passes are a viable attacking option, Germany had to change their setup to ask Denmark different questions.
In the second half, they changed their preparation from a 3-1 shape to a 4-2 shape with Kroos next to Andrich and launched the attacks from deeper positions.
Denmark responded by pushing Hojbjerg to mark Kroos, but that increased the distance between their midfield and defensive line, leaving them vulnerable in that area and if they pushed up, the German centre-backs could play long passes in behind the defence.
In this example, Havertz drops out to offer himself as a passing option, forcing the Danish defense to move up. Schlotterbeck spots Musiala’s complementary run behind the defense, which is fired in two directions, and passes the ball into his path, with Sane making a similar run on the other side.
Musiala’s pull-back was intercepted by Vestergaard but Germany managed to win a penalty from the attack after David Raum’s cross hit Andersen’s right hand. Havertz scored from the spot to give them the lead.
Germany’s second goal came from an identical situation. Here, Hojbjerg and Delaney push towards Kroos and Emre Can and Musiala fall into the space between the lines, forcing Andersen to follow.
Musiala then changes direction and runs behind the defense, where Schlotterbeck plays the long pass…
…and the Bayern Munich striker slots the ball into the bottom corner to make it 2-0.
In the second part of the first half Germany suffered with and without the ball, but adjusting their half-time build-up shape and switching to a clearer back five out of possession with the Can’s introduction got them on track for the quarter. -finals.
Germany’s individual quality and consistent style make them a serious title contender, with their ability to refine their approach only adding to their strengths.
News Source : www.nytimes.com
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