German leaders have poorly calculated the popular will for war expenses

Consensus for the general public on financial rearmament

Aversion to contract debts to finance public spending, including for defense, was a central political principle of the CDU-CSU in the German center. THE Zeitenende (Change of era) Declared by Chancellor Scholz in 2022 provided exceptional funding of $ 100 billion for defense, allowing Germany to reach the target of 2% of GDP set by NATO last year.

However, the last decision of Merz – which can be considered as an intensification Zeitenende – Allows any defense expenditure of more than 1% of GDP be exempt from the braking of the debt. The justification given is a potential Russian military threat and the conviction that the United States is determined to reduce its commitments to the conventional defense of Europe.

The CDU of Merz pays the price with its fiscally conservative voters, who oppose new public debts for the increase in defense, rather than reducing expenses to pay it. These voters consider Merz’s recovery on budgetary probity as a betrayal of its own electoral campaign program.

Presumably, the increase in AFD support comes from the defection of some of the CDU-CSU voters. Although Scholz and his cabinet resigned on March 25, they remain as guards until the new government under Merz is formed, perhaps from Easter.

Public opinion and the program of the general public parties

The tension between the determination of the traditional parts to continue to arm Ukraine and an increasing preference among a large part of the public for the search for a negotiated result has for some time obvious. The Ebert Foundation Safety radar 2025 Report documents The increase in public anxiety in Germany and elsewhere in Europe on a possible escalation of war in Ukraine, for example, 59%of Germans feared that the war will degenerate to the use of nuclear weapons, and a majority (54%) of the Germans agreed that defense expenses should increase, with 36%.

However, 53% favored a negotiated war regulations even if Ukraine must sacrifice the territory. A third of the Germans favored membership in NATO to Ukraine, a quarter favored the support of Ukraine “until it wins” and only 11% favored the deployment of German troops in Ukraine.

These results suggest that customary German reluctance concerning armed conflicts and the preference for peaceful conciliation of conflicts has not been exceeded by any martial fervor.

The German public promotes the increase in defense spending, as long as it is understood as ensuring the responsibility of the conventional defense of Germany itself, rather than giving priority to the defense of Ukraine in the present war. The security radar report has discerned through Europe a mood expressed by the slogan “My country first”.

How much and how long will spending increase?

The actual magnitude of a boost for defense spending in the coming years remains a question for the programmatic document of the coalition (still negotiated). Relaxation of defense expenditure has so far produced a Additional 3 billion euros For Ukraine in 2025, it is necessary to add to the 4 billion euros already approved for 2025. This includes German -made air defense systems which will have to be produced. There is not yet an indication of the release of a torrent of new funds or arms in Ukraine.

Neither the outgoing chancellor Scholz nor Friedrich Merz indicated that Germany would contribute to the troops for the peacekeeping effort “Coalition of the Willing” advanced by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the French president Emmanuel Macron. The question of the supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine probably poses shortly after taking office of the new government. Merz previously recommended sending them, or at least threatening to do so to demand the concessions of Russia. Throughout his mandate, Scholz firmly resisted the pressure to provide these missiles.

A recent report Since the Breugel economic reflection group has believed that defense equipment, workforce and industrial developments would be necessary for Europe to assume most or the entire conventional defense of Europe without the United States.

The authors argue that Germany must increase its defense expenses to 3.5% of GDP over the next three years and had to increase the limits of public debt to do this. They suggest that Europe would be confronted with several serious constraints to try to replace American equipment in a timely manner and technical contributions to the Ukrainians in a continuous war.

A lot economistsMarket analysts and the DAX stock index responded positively to the expected increases in defense expenses, predicting a recovery From the weak economy of Germany to the implementation of the plan. The plan includes a fund of 500 billion euros for the modernization of infrastructure to spend more than 12 years.

What awaits us?

Essentially, the financing of a major increase in German defense expenditure belongs to the logic of the continental conventional defense in the United States to European members of NATO. It is based on the continuous commitment of NATO Americans, in the hope that a new labor division will convince Americans of the value of their continuous commitment to European security.

In addition, the increase in expenses should be sustainable over the years so that Germany’s conventional capacity compensates for an American withdrawal of forces deployed in Europe. Because the rearmament aims to reach a greater “independence” of the United States, the German and European arms industry benefits.

The European public is apparently not fully convinced of the need to adopt a radically modified security position for Germany and European NATO members. In order to ensure stability and gain sustainable public support, the transfer of conventional defense burden in Europe should be associated with the renewal of diplomatic contacts with Russia and a program to control armaments and strengthening mutual confidence.