‘Drone Hunting Drones’ Are Already Impacting Middle East Conflicts

The 358 looks like an air-to-air missile. According to a report in Iranian state media, the 358 is a cylinder nearly 9 feet long, with body and tail fins and a weight of 22 pounds. warhead. The report claims it can reach an altitude of 28,000 feet, but says it is primarily designed to intercept low-flying drones.

“The Iranian 358 ground-to-air system has become a staple of groups allied with Iran,” said James Patton Rogers, executive director of the Cornell Brooks Tech Policy Institute at Cornell University and author of Accuracy: A History of the American Wartold Business Insider.

“Used by the Houthis, like the Saqr/Hawk, stray munitions have proven effective against Saudi drone systems and have even been deemed a threat against U.S. aircraft operating in the region by the Pentagon,” Rogers said. “Reports of the 358s being used against Israeli drones by Hezbollah have also surfaced, making the system one of the most widely used and effective in the Middle East.”

The 358 is an unusual weapon. It can be fired from a rudimentary launcher like those often used by these activists, and after its initial ascent on a rocket engine, it is most likely powered by some sort of jet engine like those found in cruise missiles. All 358 missiles confiscated by the US Navy were powered by small gas turbine engines made by a Dutch company.

The missile then “flies in the shape of an eight” in a designated area while waiting for enemies to lock on using the optical sensor in its seeker head. It also has infrared proximity fuses that can detonate the warhead once the missile is close to its target. It is apparently designed to wander around a specific area until it finds something to attack or runs out of gas.

The missiles are much slower than traditional surface-to-air missiles and are therefore unlikely to endanger airborne combat aircraft. However, the continued proliferation of these systems among militants could provide an entirely new capability to groups long hunted by advanced drones like Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2.

“Mid-altitude, long-endurance drones, like those adopted by Turkey, are particularly vulnerable because they were designed for use in regions where air control is maintained,” Rogers said. “In addition, any low-flying aviation, such as helicopters or planes landing at remote bases, could be subject to increased threat.”

“Yet this is only the beginning of an offensive-defensive cycle, with states adapting their drones with defense systems and groups seeking ever longer and more powerful air defense measures,” Rogers added.

Ryan Bohl, senior analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at risk intelligence firm RANE, noted that the Type 358 missile has had “some notable successes.”

“They provide a certain degree of flexibility to Hezbollah, freeing its air defense network from its total geographic anchorage by allowing it to loiter in the skies,” Bohl told BI. “However, they have not yet demonstrated the ability to close the skies to Western warplanes, and should therefore be seen as an obstacle to Israeli combat operations rather than as a substantial blockage.”

Rogers predicted that errant 358 and similar missiles “will likely continue to be deployed on a large scale, leading to a worrying potential for escalation as the United States and its allies respond to attacks on their military systems.”

“As air defense systems become more powerful and effective, this will pose a new challenge for drone systems that have long controlled the skies,” Rogers said. “We are seeing a new era of offensive and defensive challenges and a new era of contested airspace.”

“Drone hunting drones”

A report in March speculates that Turkey’s archenemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK group, may have acquired stray Iranian Meraj missiles. These claims coincide with the PKK’s recent claim that it shot down 13 Turkish drones over Iraqi Kurdistan.

“With variants of the Meraj family of ‘fighter drones’ documented in Iraq, it is technically possible that the PKK obtained such systems, either directly from Iran or otherwise,” Rogers said.

He noted that the most advanced Meraj system, the 532, has a maximum altitude of 12,000 feet. Turkish drones like the Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci can fly at 40,000 feet.

“While it remains possible that the PKK has found ways to smuggle or illegally obtain Iranian systems, this would be in limited quantity given that Tehran has its own problems with the PKK and little interest in supplying such systems to an anti-Turkish faction, for fear of upsetting Turkish-Iranian relations,” Bohl said.

“It seems, at least strategically, far-fetched.”

The PKK would need large quantities of Meraj surveillance systems if it is to “overcome” Turkey’s enormous “drone and logistics” advantage, Bohl said. But if the group managed to capture or smuggle a few, the RANE analyst predicts they “could provide a localized tactical consideration for one-on-one encounters between the PKK and Turkey.”

“The real constraint on the use of non-state actors is their supply; they need some sort of firm supply line to a state that manufactures them, because few of them can be cobbled together in makeshift factories ” said Bohl.

Although the 358 has proven capable of intercepting occasional drones and complicating flight operations, it has not closed any airspace to U.S. or allied military operations and is unlikely to do so.

“I think roaming drones are less about the end of Western air dominance in the region and more about providing a way for less advanced powers to have at least some layers of air defense against these rivals,” Bohl said. “This could contrast with groups like ISIS, which have virtually no air defense and must support Western air power in any confrontation.”

“Iran and its allies will have air defense networks that will add deterrence to escalation, but will not necessarily block air operations, especially covert ones conducted by stealth units.”