Israel firmly focuses on its campaign in Gaza and the twin imperatives to “increase the pressure on Hamas to release the hostages, and put an end to the power of Hamas to govern, both politically and militarily”, as a spokesperson for TDS, Brig.-Gen. Effie Defrin told journalists during a visit to Gaza this week.
The FDI always has work to do, but, like a source of FDI The Jerusalem postThere was a “drop in capacity of Hamas, although they can always surprise”.
Regarding the Rafah brigade of Hamas, against which the FDI is currently engaged in the fight along the Morag corridor between Khan Yunis and Rafah City, “we assume that the missile problem is largely behind,” continued the source. What remains is a narrow fight to destroy the remaining fighters of the brigade, the probably number of 100 to 150 men.
But while the threat of formerly formidable missile of Gaza has decreased considerably, residents of Haifa and Western Galilee were recalled on Wednesday morning that Gaza is not the only active front in the current conflict, when a ballistic missile launched from Yemen triggered warning sirens. There was no injury and the missile seems to have been destroyed by the air defenses. The Ansar Allah organization (Houthis), which controls the Yemeni capital and a large part of the country, claimed the responsibility for the launch.
Yemen Arena is currently the most active in all fronts open following the massacres of October 7 of Hamas by elements aligned by Iran. Iranian deadly proxies in Lebanon and Iraq have for the moment chose to leave the fray. The Assad regime in Syria was destroyed. Iran itself has not yet responded to the vast counter-tribes of Israel following the launch of missiles and drones by Iran against Israel last October. Hamas in Gaza clings, with its seriously degraded capacities.
Only the Houthis, once rejected as a barely relevant spectacle, remain fully engaged, with high capacities and determined to continue the fight. They are the only force aligned with Iran not to have suffered serious backhand since the launch of their campaign. They are also the only member of the Pro-Iran axis to have directed his attacks not to Israel, but also to Western targets.
Since the end of the ceasefire in Gaza on March 18, the organization has launched around 20 ballistic missiles in Israel. But the targeting of the Houthis of Israel is largely symbolic in nature. The most substantial part of their efforts, since it started in November 2023 has not been directed against Israeli targets, but rather, international navigation along the Rouge of the Red Sea / from the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal. Fifteen percent of the world’s world trade before the war passed through this path. Houthi attacks have now closed it practically.
It has been a year ago that a ship struck by the United States crossed the Suez Canal. The Trump administration, unlike his preference for agreements to put an end to the acts of assault elsewhere, seems determined to force the Houthis to end their campaign and seems willing to support threats with force. At the start of the offensive in March, Trump warned the Yemeni Shiite Islamists that if the attacks against the expedition did not stop, “Hell will rain on you as nothing you have ever seen before.”
Last Thursday, 80 people were killed in a series of American air strikes on the strategic port controlled by the Houthi at Ras Isa, the province of Hodeidah and the Yemenite capital, Sanaa. Strikes have been the most intense to date in the United States campaign against Houthi targets.
The United States is uncomfortable on the growing influence of Houthis
The American concerns concerning the Houthis go beyond the immediate Yemeni context. In the past six months, evidence has emerged from an increasing bond between Ansar Allah and the Al-Shabaab organization in Somalia. A United Nations February report noted that the staff of the two movements met in Somalia in July and September 2024.
During these meetings, according to the report, the Houthis undertook to provide Al-Shabaab with weapons and technical assistance, including drones and air surface missiles. The prospect of Houthis using the Al-Shabaab connection with proliferated chaos and Iranian influence through the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa apparently helps to concentrate spirits in Washington.
The American American campaign struck the Houthis strongly. However, it remains questionable to know whether the volume of damage will so far be sufficient to persuade the Yemeni Shiite Islamist movement to cease its attacks on Western expedition and Israel.
Here, the United States is faced with a dilemma similar to that which has been confronted with Israel vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza. In both cases, the Islamist enemy is largely indifferent to loss of life among his own people, and he is even inclined to change direction following losses between his own staff or his own equipment.
At this stage, the United States faces options concerning Houthis similar to those with which Israel had to face Gaza – namely, increase or concede effectively. Either a decision must be made to destroy or severely degrade the enemy, or it must be admitted that the Houthis, when they can be engaged in an exchange of tit-form shooting in which they pay the higher cost, cannot currently be defeated.
It is in this context that the recent reports of a possible offensive on the ground against the Houthis by the Yemeni government and the Allied troops should be understood.
Reports suggesting that such an offensive can be imminent has surfaced in the main American and regional media in the past two weeks. An article in the Wall Street Journal on April 15 noted that the idea of the ground action came due to a perception among the elements of the Official Government Yemeni that the American bombing campaign had seriously damaged the capacities of the Houthis, creating a window of opportunity.
Such an offensive, if it comes, is likely to be directed against the western coastal zone of Yemen. The port of Hodeidah and the surroundings are a crucial location to receive imports for the Houthis. The coast is also essential for the continuation of the Houthi campaign against expedition.
American air support would be vital for such a campaign. In the past, in particular in 2015, the forces supported by the Saudi- and the water has poorly performed and without much success against the Houthis. At that time, however, the United States was ambivalent with regard to the offensive and not convinced by the danger of Iranian expansion represented by Houthi advances. This time, the situation would be different, the United States played an active role supporting such an offensive.
It may well be that the forces associated with the official Yemeni government observed the rapid success of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, which arises largely from the prior wealth of Israel of the Lebanese organization of Hezbollah. Without that, Hezbollah would have almost certainly intervened to save the Assad regime, which most likely stopped the advance of HTS before Homs or Hama.
However, weakened by American bombings or not, the Houthis are a very different force of the hollow army of the Assad regime. Such an offensive, like actions of this type, would be something of a bet.
For the United States and its local allies in Yemen, the choice is now to increase the issues or to fold.
