Washington – The American space force of April 17 has published its most explicit plan to date to know how it plans to defend American satellites – and, if necessary, aim for enemy space systems – in the event of conflict.
The document, entitled “Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners”, explains how American forces could affirm the control of the high orbital terrain through a range of offensive and defensive operations, reflecting an evolution of the way the military thinks of the war beyond the earth.
“This document is very specific to spatial superiority,” said Lieutenant-General Shawn Bratton, deputy chief of space force space operations for strategy, plans, programs and requirements.
Central premise: space is no longer a benign or neutral environment. American defense planners now consider space as an active battlefield – the one that underlies almost all modern military functions, from missile warning systems to precision navigation. If these space systems are compromised, the rest of the American army could be found in a dangerous disadvantage.
Bratton said the advice is intended to serve as an internal training tool: members of the space force – called guards – must be ready to guarantee freedom of movement in space for American forces while refusing adversaries.
“We feel the weight,” said Bratton to journalists. “It is not only that we are going to fight in space and see who wins the space fight. It is that we are going to fight in space to make sure that our aircraft carrier does not hit and that 5,000 sailors will not go to the bottom of the ocean.”
A change of tone
Since its creation in 2019, the Space Force has gradually sought to assert its identity as a branch of fully operational war struggle. Bratton said that the release of the war control manual reflects the “normalization” of the spatial force as a military branch which provides and waged war alongside other services.
The army often describes space as “congestioned and disputed” – a carefully calibrated language which avoided an open discussion on offensive capacities. But Bratton recognized that culture is changing.
The sharp tone of spatial force aligns with a wider push of the Pentagon to instill what military leaders call a “philosophy of fighting war” – a cultural emphasis on the preparation, the effectiveness of the fight and the will to engage the opponents directly if necessary.
“We have a new administration that focused on this,” said Bratton. “We have a defense secretary who is very interested in philosophy and lethality, and we naturally progress to the point where we go beyond to protect and defend ” and yes, we are going to talk about offensive capacities in space.”
The document establishes what Bratton described as a “common framework” and a “common lexicon” for planning, training and education. It includes detailed examples of what spatial force operations can look like in practice, especially when it comes to preventing opponents from using space to their advantage.
What could offensive operations look like
Although the document does not discuss or not mention specific weapons, it lays the basics of how offensive actions could be planned or justified in the future.
An offensive form of action is an orbital strike, aimed at deactivating or destroying an enemy satellite that could be used to support ground operations, such as monitoring American ships or guiding missiles.
Another is the prohibition of space binding, which uses electromagnetic attacks or cyber attacks to disturb the data flow of an enemy between satellites and ground stations. A third type of action – a earthly strike – could target enemy launch sites, antennas or ground command centers which control spatial operations. These strikes could be carried out by other military branches but situate themselves under the broader umbrella of the protection of the superiority of American space.
Although the document indicates how the United States could carry out strikes or disrupt opponent space systems, the spatial force also stresses that such operations must be carried out with caution and responsibility, if possible avoiding the creation of debris or long-term dangers in orbit which could threaten civil, commercial or allied space assets.
Bratton noted that the document is not a revelation of new spatial weapons. “But it is certainly intended to start this discussion on what we need to compete and gain in space,” he said.
This discussion arises in a context of greater concern about the spatial capacities of almost-peers like China and Russia. In this context, the spatial force formalizes the way it plans to defend and, if necessary, fight in space to guarantee that wider soldiers – the joint force – can continue to operate effectively.
